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Abstract—Nowadays virtualization is used as the sole
mechanism to isolate different users on Cloud platforms.
We will show that due to improper virtualization of micro-
architectural components, data leak and modification can
occur on public Clouds. Furthermore, using the same
vector, it is possible to induce performance interferences,
i.e. noisy neighbors. Using this approach, a VM can
slow down and steal resources from concurrent VMs. We
propose placement heuristics that take into account iso-
lation requirements. We modify three classical heuristics
to take into account these requirements. Furthermore,
we propose four new heuristics that take into account
the hierarchy of the Cloud platforms and the isolation
requirements. Finally, we evaluate these heuristics and
compare them with the modified classical ones. We show
that our heuristics are performing at least as good as
classical ones but are scaling better and are faster by a
few order of magnitude than the classical ones.
Keywords-Security, Isolation, Hierarchical VM Place-
ment, Covert-channel, Cloud Computing, IaaS
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtualization is now widely used in modern data
centers. Thank to mature software stacks and the
widespread availability of platforms all over the world,
the Cloud is now available for many applications of
different kinds. Security and performance are the main
goal users want to achieve when porting applications
over IaaS or PaaS platforms. Security has been proven
to be sometimes difficult to obtain [1] and several issues
have been raised in public Clouds and public domain
virtualization software stacks. Several different kinds of
attacks and security issues can be observed that may
lower the impact of Clouds. On the performance side,
the expectations are higher than what can be actually
obtained on today’s public Clouds. Shared Physical
Machines lead to performance degradation that are not
appropriate for high performance applications. Isolation
is then a critical issue both for security and performance
concerns.
In this paper, we present the limitation of using
virtualization technology as the sole approach to isolate
workloads and users within a Cloud. In highly secured
environments, strong isolation is done by unshared
resources environment for two tasks with different se-
curity clearance. It is still the strongest defense against
covert-channels (and other attacks). But this approach
eliminates most of the current public and private Clouds
but also the way how virtualization is used. With the
widespread usage of virtualization, the need of strong
isolation in such environment becomes critical.
First, in Section II, we present the micro-architecture
of modern computer. We also present the virtualization
limitations and how they can be exploited to attack secu-
rity and privacy in the Clouds. Moreover, we show that
the same issue exists for performance. In Section III,
we introduce a set of VM placement heuristics that take
into account the security requirements. Furthermore, we
propose a set of optimization for these heuristics to im-
prove performance and consolidation. In the Section IV,
we present our evaluation methodology and explain our
results. Finally, in the Section V, we conclude and
present our future work.
II. MICRO-ARCHITECTURE: WHERE
VIRTUALIZATION FAILED
Since the last few years, the complexity of physical
machines’ hardware topology has increased dramati-
cally [2]. The number of cores, shared caches, and
memory nodes have completely changed the micro-
architecture of computers. From a simple CPU archi-
tecture during the Pentium era, we have now access to
complex multi-core, multi-level caches that can be spe-
cific to a core, shared between some or all. Symmetric
Multithreaded Processors (SMP) brings another level of
hierarchy. SMP is a mean to share the resources of a
core between multiple logical processors.
With the increasing number of cores, scalability be-
comes a major issue. To address it, modern proces-
sors use non-uniform interconnects1. This technology
is named a Non-Uniform Memory Access (NUMA)
architecture. But memory is not the only resources to
be accessed through these non-uniform interconnects,
Input/Ouput Devices accesses are done in a similar
manner (Non-Uniform Input/Output Access – NUIOA).
In this type of architecture, some cores have faster
access than others to some I/O devices and memory
banks [3]. For example, Figure 1 shows the inner
architectural components of five modern platforms. As
one can see, depending on whether the data is stored in
a directly connected memory bank or in a remote one,
the access to it will need to passthrough one (or more)
CPU. The same is true for the I/O devices. Accordingly,
the placement of tasks on CPU and their related data
on memory banks is critical to exploit performance on
these modern architecture.
Figure 1. Interconnection of processors (P), memory (M) and I/O
chipsets in some modern architectures [3]: (a) four AMD Istanbul
processors; (b) four AMD Magny-Cours processors; (c) and (d) two
Intel Westmere-EP processors; (e) four Intel Nehalem-EX processors.
The inner-topology of computer has a large impact
on performance depending where the different process
of an application are placed. For example, the DMA
throughput can decrease by up to 42% when accessing
a GPU from a distant NUMA node. Thus, exporting
the topology to the VM is critical. Virtualized NUMA
(vNUMA) is already available [4]. But there is not
a one-to-one mapping between virtual and physical
NUMA. Indeed, some physical NUMA can be shared
through two vNUMA by VMs and two NUMA can be
aggregated into one vNUMA. Accordingly, performance
optimization can be buried by the vNUMA not really
providing the same kind of hardware connections it
1HyperTransport for AMD and QPI for Intel.
exposes.
A. Covert-Channel
Contrary to the memory and CPU, the micro-
architectural component are not properly virtualized
in modern platform. Therefore, the sharing of micro-
architectural components can be used as covert channels
to leak information between concurrent VMs. In [5],
authors present new work on the creation of covert
channels of communication between virtual machines
through the L2 cache processors. Their goal is to
quantify the rate of leakage through this channel. In
previous work [1], three channels were studied: memory
(0.006bps), disk (0.0005bps), and L2 cache (0.2bps).
The purpose of [5] is to see if they can optimize the
speed. In experimental testbeds, they were able to reach
a rate of 223.71bps and between 1.27bps and 10.46bps
on Amazon EC2. Other studies of covert channels
within Clouds have been made in [6], [7].
In [8], authors present a new inter-VMs attack in
the Cloud. Unlike previous works, they do not use the
L2 cache CPU but the memory bus. This new channel
allows them not to be limited to a set of cores sharing
a cache but they can reach the entire physical machine.
To do this, they observe the memory bus contention
as covert channel. They are able to create a covert
channel with a bandwidth of 746.8 bps (+/- 10.1) and
between 343.5 bps (+/- 66.1) and 107.9 bps (+/- 39.9)
on Amazon EC2. This improvement is at least a factor
of 10 with approaches via the L2 cache.
B. Noisy Neighbors: Performance Interference
Virtualization is also used in Cloud Computing to
provide performance isolation between multiple tenants.
With a perfect performance isolation, no performance
interference between two VMs must exist. Thus, noisy
VM will have no impact on the performance of other
VMs. Hypervisors implement resources allocation al-
gorithms that fairly shares resources between different
VMs. But these algorithms focus only on CPU time and
memory capacity and do not take into account other
resources [9]. Furthermore, current hardware virtual-
ization does not provide mechanisms to limit micro-
architectural components usage.
With the lack of strong isolation and in particular on
micro-architectural components, the performance of a
VM can suffer from interference coming from another
one running on the same hardware. In [10], authors
show that the performance loss can be up to 80% on
a cache-sensitive benchmark because of the behavior
of a collocated VM. But others works have shown the
same type of performance loss can be achieved by
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attacking shared memory [11] and [12]. Other works
have studied the strong performance interference in
Cloud Computing platforms [13], [14], [15]. As one can
expect, all the shared resources (compute, storage and
network) in Clouds are affected by interference issues.
The effectiveness of such interference could lead to a
new class of attacks called Resource-Freeing Attacks
(RFA) in [10]. “A resource-freeing attack leverages
these observations of contention to improve a VM’s
performance by forcing a competing VM to saturate
some bottleneck resources”. The purpose of such attack
would be to create interference that leads a VM to starve
due to its inability to access specific micro-architectural
components and thus freeing other resources. Accord-
ingly, the VM that launches the attack could used these
resources to boost its performance. Authors of [10] have
shown they can gain a performance boost of up to 60%
in lab and 13% on Amazon EC2.
C. Detection of Covert-Channel
Amazon provides a service that dedicates physical
machines to an user: dedicated instances. But this ser-
vice comes with a high price. [7] propose to contin-
uously monitor memory access latencies and generates
alarms when anomalies are detected. But memory prob-
ing incurs high performance overhead. Moreover, their
approach has a high false positive rate.
VALID [16] is a specific language for security assur-
ance. The goal is to verify the respect of security proper-
ties i.e. to detect violations of them. The language can
express security goals such as isolation and generally
express security properties based on information flow.
Their approach is limited to detect isolation faults in
network and is not able to do it for micro-architectures.
D. Improving Isolation within a Physical Machine
As we have presented in Section II-A, it is possible to
create covert channels between VMs by using the lack of
proper virtualization of micro-architectural components.
In [17], authors propose to improve the isolation of
virtual machines while minimizing the loss of con-
solidation. The approach consists in offering better
refinement within this isolation. They propose two algo-
rithms: cache hierarchy aware core assignment and page
coloring based cache partitioning. It limits the risk of
breaking the isolation between virtual machines without
having to use multiple physical machines. But their
approach introduces a very large overhead that renders
it inapplicable on real world Cloud platforms.
In [18], authors propose a protection that allows the
hypervisor to counter attacks on CPU caches. Their
approach has an overhead equivalent to 3 % loss of
memory and cache. In addition, it brings an overhead
of 5.9 to 7.2 % in terms of computation. Other works
around software mechanisms to increase performance
isolation exist for other resources: disk [19], memory
bandwidth [20], and network [21].
The NoHype concept [22], [23] consists in removing
the virtualization layer while retaining the key features
enabled by virtualization. They limit covert-channel
by enabling one VM per core but as we have show,
other covert-channels exist within the micro-architecture
components. Moreover, they are not able to do fair
sharing on I/O and memory bus. Thus the performance
isolation between VMs with NoHype remains weak.
E. Discussions
As we have shown in this section, the micro-
architecture of modern platforms is evolving very fast.
From a single CPU processor few years ago, we have
now access to massively parallel platforms with com-
plex hierarchy of micro-architectural components.
The current trend of security in Clouds is to use
virtualization as the sole mechanism to enforce se-
curity and performance isolation between users and
their VMs. But the lack of proper isolation of micro-
architectural components lead to the ability of creating
covert-channels between these VMs. It has been shown
that it is possible to use these covert-channels to extract
sensitive information such as cryptographic keys. But
the security isolation is only one fold of a two folds
issue. Performance isolation is also critical for Clouds.
Indeed, if a VM is not able to efficiently use its avail-
able resources due to a noisy neighbor, it can lead to
availability issue. As we have shown, a VM can applied
such noisy neighbor behavior to slowdown a collocated
VM. That leads the collocated VM to release resources
and the VM who launches the attacks is able to extract
more performance from the Cloud.
Motivation: As we have shown depending of the
micro-architectural components shared between VMs,
it is more or less effective to create covert-channels.
The same is true for performance isolation. The sharing
(or not) of micro-architectural components brings to
complex security and performance trade-offs. Providing
the tenant with the ability to specify the level of sharing
his VMs can accept for micro-architectural components
would give the ability to the user to configure the quality
of isolation for each of his VMs. In the rest of the
paper, we propose an approach to provide adaptable
isolation. We show how it can be ported to any resource
management system at node level (hypervisor) and at
Cloud level.
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III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION WITH SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS
To help guide the placement of virtual machines, the
main approach is to use constraints which reflect the
goals expressed by the user and the entity that operates
the infrastructure. By expressing the placement problem
as Constraint Satisfaction Problems (CSP), it is possible
to use a solver to resolve it. Constraints can represent
different goals such as energy saving [24]. But solving
large problems is time consuming thus using a decen-
tralized and hierarchical approach can decrease the com-
putation of a solution [25], [26]. The principle of using
a linear program or a linear system to solve the problem
of placement of virtual machines in the Cloud with
constraints has been studied numerous times as in [27],
[28]. The constraints can modelize numerous goals
such as performance and availability [29]. These goals
are then translate into collocation and anti-collocation
constraints. As for the CSP approach, linear program
approaches do not scale. To improve the performance
of VM placement algorithm, hierarchical representation
allows to reduce the search space [29]. Avoiding cache
and processor resource contention through scheduling
algorithms is a well studied approach [30], [31], [32].
At the cluster level, numerous works have also been
done [33], [34]. The purpose of these approaches is to
increase performance isolation between processes.
The current issue is to have efficient and scalable
algorithms that are able to work at the scale of multi-
datacenters Cloud infrastructure. CSP or linear program
approaches do not scale well. Indeed, placing VMs
on Clouds can be formalized as a multi-dimensional
bin-packing. Therefore, the complexity of solving such
problem is NP-Complete. Heuristics allow to have al-
most optimal solutions with a reduced complexity. In
this paper, we propose to use such heuristics. They
are able to take into account isolation requirements
while placing VMs on a multi-datacenter Clouds or any
infrastructures described through the distributed system
model.
A. User Isolation Requirement
The purpose of the user isolation requirement is to
enforce isolation between users.
The requirement has a scope where it applies i.e. a
level in the hierarchy of the distributed systems. For
example, if the requirement’s scope is PM, it will apply
to all the level below the PM e.g. NUMA and socket and
at the PM level. We differentiate 3 types of isolation
requirement: alone, friends and enemies. With alone
requirement, the user specifies that only his VMs can
shared the resources at a given level (and all the above
ones). With friends one, the user specifies a list of
users allowed to share resources with him. And with
ennemies, the user specifies a list of users that must
never share resources with him.
To verify these requirements, we introduce two func-
tions. The first one checks if a node and the VMs already
allocated on it respects the user’s requirements. Further-
more, the functions also verifies if all the nodes above
the checked node also verifies the user’s requirements.
The second one verifies if a new VM respects the user’s
requirements of all VMs already allocated on a given
PM.
B. Heuristics
In this section, we will first present two optimizations
than can used by all VM placement heuristics. Then,
we present heuristics that do not take into account the
hierarchy in the section. We present a first fit heuristic
that takes into account the hierarchy. Finally, we present
best fit heuristics that take into account the hierarchy.
1) Optimizations: A function, Check Capacity, is
used by the heuristics to verify that a node of the
distributed system has enough resources for a VM. To
avoid to search in a branch of the hierarchy if no node
within it contains enough resources to start a VM, we
introduce the optimization betterF it. Indeed, a level in
the hierarchy can have enough free aggregated resources
of a specific capacity but these resources are shared
between PMs. For example, a cluster can have 20 free
CPU cores but with only a maximal block of 4 available
on a PM. Thus, without betterF it, the algorithm will
try to find a PM that can host the VM that requests 8 CPU
cores but will failed as none contains enough resources.
With betterF it, the algorithm will know that there is no
block of CPU cores larger than 4 and thus it can avoid
to iterate through all the PMs of the cluster. Therefore,
betterF it avoids to search in branch where there is no
solution.
Except for the FirstFit heuristics, all the VM place-
ment heuristics presented here return a list of PMs. Thus,
we need to sort this list to select the PM that is the best to
start the VM. All the PMs returned by the VM placement
heuristics fit the capacity and isolation requirements, the
sorting algorithm does not change anything about it. But
the sorting algorithm helps to improve the quality of
placement by selecting the best fitting PMs in a list of
fitting PMs. Moreover, the same heuristic can be used
to sort all the nodes in the hierarchy and not only the
PMs. Indeed, in some heuristics, we need to sort a list of
nodes at other level e.g. clusters within the hierarchy.
We use two different sorting heuristics. sortBestF it
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applies best fit i.e. it places at the beginning of the list
the nodes that have just enough resources for the VM. It
helps to improve the consolidation of the nodes while
respecting the resources and isolation requirements.
sortBestF itAppsAffinity is more advanced version
that takes into account already placed VMs. In addition
of best fit, it puts at the beginning of the list the
nodes where VMs from the same application are already
running. Then the nodes that has a father, i.e. a node at a
higher level in the hierarchy, where VMs from the same
application are running. And recursively, it does so for
every upper levels. For example, it will put at first two
PMs where VMs from the same application are already
running and will sort one from the other one by applying
the best fit heuristic. Then, it will put the PMs that
belong to a cluster where VMs from the same application
are running and applies best fit heuristic between them.
Therefore, it helps to consolidate the application by
placing the VMs belonging to an application close to
another. Thus, it helps to minimize the latency between
VMs of an application. Moreover, by grouping the VMs
of an application on a sub-part of the hierarchy, it helps
to improve the number of allocated VMs by avoiding
to spread an application in the hierarchy. Indeed, if
an application is spread in the distributed system and
required an isolation requirement with a scope at the
upper level of the hierarchy, it can lock a large part of
the distributed system for one application.
2) Heuristics not Hierarchy-Aware: In this paper,
we present new heuristics that take into account the
hierarchy of distributed systems such as cloud. But, we
want to compare our heuristics with ones that do not
take into account hierarchy. Even if they do not take
into account the hierarchy, they respect the capacity and
isolation requirements. The FirstF it heuristic takes the
list of all the PMs on the distributed system. It iterates
trough it until it finds a node that fits the capacity and
isolation requirements. The issue with FirstF it is that
it always iterates on a fixed list of PMs. To improve
it, FirstF itShuffle does a shuffle on the list of PMs
before iterating on it. The BestF it heuristic takes the
list of all the PMs on the distributed systems. It returns
a list that contains all fitting PMs. This list can then
be sorted using one of the sorting algorithms presented
previously.
3) BestFit: HierarchicalAwareBestF it (HABF)
takes into account the hierarchy. It applies one of the
two sorting algorithms at each level of the hierarchy.
First, it sorts using one of the two sorting algorithms
all the root of the distributed systems and selects the
best fitting one. Then it does the same with each child
of the best fit node. Recursively, it reaches a subset
of PMs, e.g. the PMs belonging to a cluster that fits the
capacity and isolation requirements and returns this list.
The list can be then sorted using one of the two sorting
algorithms. All the best fit hierarchy-aware heuristics
presented here including this one are based on a Breath
First Search algorithm.
4) BestFit with Properties: Contrary to the pre-
vious one, HierarchicalAwareBestF itwProperties
(HABFP) starts to use best fit only when it reaches
a level in the hierarchy that is equal to the higher
level expressed by the isolation requirements. Thus,
it will iterate through all the branches of the tree at
the beginning. By doing so, the heuristic is able to
choose the best fit node at a specific level in the
hierarchy and is not limited to the children of the best
fit node of each level. Unless the higher level expressed
by isolation requirements is the higher level of the
hierarchy, the heuristic will iterate through more nodes
but it can find a best fit nodes that is behind a non
best fit nodes. For example, an application specifies an
isolation requirements at the cluster level. If using the
first version of the best fit hierarchy-aware heuristic, it
will select a cluster in best fit site. With this heuristic,
it will iterate through all the sites and all the clusters
belonging to each site. It will then select the best fit
cluster.
5) BestFit Large: As we previously state, a best fit
node can be behind a not best fit node at a upper
level in the hierarchy. Thus, doing best fit at each level
of the hierarchy can have bad effects by hiding some
nodes. HierarchicalAwareBestF itLarge (HABFL)
still applies a best fit hierarchy-aware heuristic but it
iterates through all the valid nodes at each level. It will
not iterate through part of the system that is not fitting
capacity and isolation requirements. Thus, contrary to
the non hierarchical-aware heuristics as presented in the
Section III-B2, it does not have to iterate through all the
PMs.
6) BestFit Large with Hierarchical Sorting:
HierarchicalAwareBestF itLargeSort (HABFLS)
is a variant of HierarchicalAwareBestF itLarge.
HierarchicalAwareBestF itLargeSort returns an
already sorted list but this list is sorted differently than
HABFL. The list is hierarchically sorted such as the
first PM on the list are the ones that are the best fitting
PMs with the best fitting ancestors. For example, first
will be the sorted list of PMs of the best fitting cluster
of the best fitting site. Then the best fitting node of the
second best fitting cluster of the best fitting site, etc..
7) Summary: We summarize the different heuristics
in the table III-B7. For the heuristic complexity (without
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optimizations), we use the following formalism. In this
case, the complexity is the worst case for finding (or
not) a fitting node for a given VM, i.e. browsing all
the nodes of the platform. A platform is composed of i
hierarchical levels, with 1 the lower one, i.e. PM and i
the higher one, e.g. region. At each level, the maximal
number of nodes attached to a node of higher level is
MNi. Accordingly, the maximal number of nodes Ni
at a level i is Ni = MNi ×Ni−1. The global number
of nodes at any levels is N = ∀i,MNi × Ni−1. For
the sake of simplicity, we use NPM to express the
number of PMs. Accordingly, NPM = MNO × N1.
For example, to model the EC2 platform 2, we use
5 hierarchical levels (region, zone, cluster, rack, PM)
with MNi respectively equals to 7, 3, 5, 4 and 96. In
this case, NPM = 40320. As one can see in the ta-
ble III-B7, the theoretical complexity of hierarchy-aware
heuristics is a little bit higher than the classical ones,
i.e. an increasing of complexity of 1.4%. But, we will
show in the Section IV that in practice, the hierarchical-
aware heuristics are few orders of magnitude faster than
classical ones.
8) Inside a Physical Machine: For the moment, the
heuristic to select resources inside a PM is limited
to select specific CPU core. It can be extended for
memory and other resources such as I/O devices. To
select a set of cores inside the selected PM, we use the
HierarchicalAwareBestF itwProperties heuristic.
IV. EXPERIMENTATION
In this section, we will first present how we generate
simulation scenario then how our simulation scenario
are run. Then, we present our simulation results that
compare the different heuristics we introduced in the
previous section.
A. Scenario
In this section, we describe how we have generate
our scenario. These scenario must be plausible with
a bit of randomness. The users join and leave the
platform based on some basic market rules. At the
beginning, the platform has a few early adopters. Then,
it gains momentum with an ever increasing number
of users joining the platform. Finally, it has reach its
limit of attractiveness and few new users are joining it.
Accordingly, we approximate the number of users on the
infrastructure using a poisson distribution. Furthermore,
we use two types of models to simulate the elasticity
of applications. The first one is called Uniform, it adds
and removes VM (s) at each new application step of
2http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/
the simulation e.g. every hours by picking an amount
to add/delete randomly. The second one is called AMR,
it uses the elasticity model introduced in [35].
We limit our experimentation to applications with
only one isolation requirement. It is not a limitation
of our algorithms but it is a good first evaluation of
them. Indeed, we want to know the impact of isolation
requirements on consolidation and on placement time
thus combining different requirements will complexify
the task. For each application, we randomly select an
isolation type (and the related list of friends or ennemies
users if needed) and a level at which it applies in the
infrastructure.
On top of the isolation requirement, we need for each
new application to generate the different parameter of
an application (elasticity model, number of VMs at the
beginning, isolation requirements). Then, we just need
to launch the application i.e. schedule the VMs required
at the beginning and launch the elasticity function. It
runs continuously and based on the elastic model used,
adds or removes VMs.
B. Results
We have generate 5 scenarios: 3 (scenario #1), 30
(#2) and 300 (#3) new users per day on a Cloud using
the Grid’5000 platform and 3 (#4) and 30 (#5) new
users per day on a Cloud using the EC2 platform. We
run the 5 scenarios for for each of the 7 placement
heuristics and the two options BetterFit (BF) and App-
sAffinity (AF). NOBF and NOAF respectively indicat
that we do not use BF and AF options.
1) Consolidation: We have compute four indica-
tors for the consolidation: average CPU consolidation,
average CPU consolidation per PM, average memory
consolidation and average memory consolidation per
host. For this metric, the higher is the better. They are
computed by taking into account the PMs where VMs are
placed. We compute the ratio of the amount of resources
used against the total amount of resources on all the
PMs for average CPU and memory consolidation. We do
the same per PM and compute an average for average
CPU and memory consolidation per PM. For reasons of
space in this paper, we only display the global memory
consolidation in the Figure 2 but the others are showing
the same trend. As one can see, the impact of BF
and AF optimizations is low especially for hierarchical
heuristics. The same is true for all the other metrics.
Accordingly, in the following figures, we will not show
the value for each combination of optimizations but just
the median of all combinations and the error bar.
As shown in the Figure 2, on the Grid’5000 platform,
our hierarchical heuristics perform as good as classical
6
Short Name Hierarchicy Complexity Complexity
Name Aware EC2
FF FirstFit 7 NPM 40320
FFS FirstFitShuffle 7 NPM 40320
BF BestFit 7 NPM 40320
HABF HierarchicalAwareBestFit 3 N 40873
HABFP HierarchicalAwareBestFitwProperties 3 N 40873
HABFL HierarchicalAwareBestFitLarge 3 N 40873
HABFLS HierarchicalAwareBestFitLargeSort 3 N 40873
Table I
SUMMARY OF THE DIFFERENT HEURISTICS AND THEIR COMPLEXITY
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Figure 2. Memory consolidation per Host
one. Except for the case where 300 new users arrived
each day, in this case, the classical BestFit heuristic
is not able to run fast enough and the experimentation
failed. On the EC2 platform, our hierarchical heuristics
perform a lot better than the classical one. Indeed,
they are able to take into account the hierarchy of
the platform and improve the overall consolidation.
Whereas, classical ones only see the platform as a long
list of PMs. Accordingly, our heuristics scale better
than classical ones on large scale and hierarchical
platforms. Futhermore, all our hierarchical heuristics
perform equally from a consolidation point of view.
2) Successfully added VMs: This metric highlights
the number of VMs that have been successfully placed
by each heuristics. For this metric, the higher is the
better. As shown on the Figure 3, our heuristics perform
a little bit better, on average, than classical one on
Grid’5000 platforms. But on EC2 platforms, they are
performing at least 2 times better than the classical ones.
Accordingly, our heuristics permit to place between 2
and 4 times more VMs on the same platform than the
classical ones. This is strongly link with the consolida-
tion metrics as placing more VMs on a the same platform
required to improve a better consolidation.
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Figure 3. VM successfully added for each scenario
3) VM placement duration: In this section, we study
the impact of the different heuristics and options on
the duration of the VM placement. The lower is the
better. The duration on the Figure 4 is displayed in
nanoseconds. Except for the first experiment (3 users
per day on the Grid’5000 platform), the value for the
classical BestFit heuristic is not displayed because it
is at least 100 times higher than the worst performing
one and renders the figure unreadable if plotted. Con-
trary to the consolidation and successfully added VMs
metrics, our hierarchical heuristics perform better even
on the Grid’5000 platform. For example on the fifth
experiment, our heuristics perform between 1,000 and
10,000 faster than the two classical FirstFit heuristics.
Consequently, our heuristics are able to have at least the
same consolidation and successfully added VMs than
classical ones and being faster by at least two orders
of magnitude. Finally, one can see than HABFP and
HABFLS are slower than the two other ones. This is due
to a larger space search in average. Indeed as previously
explained, these two heuristics start to cut branch in the
search space later than the two other.
4) Impact of requirements on placement duration:
This section concludes the study of our experimentation.
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Figure 5. Average duration of placing a new VM with different level
and type of isolation
Here, we take a look on the impact of isolation require-
ments on the placement duration. We only study it for
our heuristics as the other ones does not intrinsically
take into account the isolation requirements. Futher-
more, for a reason of space, we only show the results
for a small subset of possible isolation requirements and
for only one experiment (EC2 with 30 new users per
day). We wanted to know if requiring a low (core) or
high (datacenter) level of isolation or a different type of
isolation (alone, friend, enemy) will have impact on the
placement duration. As one can see on the Figure 5, the
type of isolation is not strongly related to the placement
duration. On the contrary, the level of isolation has an
impact on the placement duration. The lower the level
of isolation is the slower the placement duration time
is. Indeed, with a high level of isolation, the heuristics
are able to reduce the search space earlier than for the
requirements that require low level of isolation. Finally,
as in the previous section, HAFP and HABFLS are
slower than the two other ones.
V. CONCLUSION
We have seen that a large range of possible and real-
world attacks on Cloud platforms are due to improper
isolation. We have shown that the existing method to
improve isolation (from a data and performance points
of view) are limited to only detecting them or induce
a large overhead. Accordingly, we propose to enhance
VM placement heuristics with isolation requirements.
We have introduce the concept of user’s isolation
requirements for hierarchical and distributed large scale
platform. Then, we have explained how these require-
ments can be used inside VM placement heuristics.
Furthermore, we have introduce 4 new heuristics that
use the hierarchical nature of the platform.
From experiments, we show that our heuristics per-
form at least as good as classical ones. Furthermore,
on large-scale platforms such as EC2, our heuristics
are performing few orders of magnitude better than the
classical ones. Finally, we highlight the correlation be-
tween VM placement duration and the level of isolation
required by a VM.
In the future, we plan to take into account the possible
correlation between consolidation and the amount of
successfully placed VMs. We work on a improved
application model with a larger scale of security re-
quirements. We plan to extend our heuristics to support
the whole scope of the requirements and applications
expressed through it. Finally, we will extend our heuris-
tics to allocate network resources as well.
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